Abstract. We revisit the notions of robustness introduced by Abdalla, Bellare, and Neven (TCC 2010). One of the main motivations for the introduction of strong robustness for public-key encryption (PKE) by Abdalla et al. to prevent certain types of attack on Sako's auction protocol. We show, perhaps surprisingly, that Sako's protocol is still vulnerable to attacks exploiting robustness problems in the underlying PKE scheme, even when it is instantiated with a strongly robust scheme. This demonstrates that current notions of robustness are insufficient even for one of its most natural applications. To address this and other limitations in existing notions, we introduce a series of new robustness notions for PKE and explore their relationships. In particular, we introduce complete robustness, our strongest new notion of robustness, and give a number of constructions for completely robust PKE schemes.
Introduction
A commonly pursued goal in cryptography is message privacy, which is typically achieved by means of encryption. In recent years, the privacy of users has become an equally relevant concern. It has led the research community to strive for anonymity properties when designing cryptographic primitives. In publickey encryption, in particular, key-privacy (a.k.a. receiver anonymity) was introduced in [4] to capture the idea that a ciphertext does not leak any information about the public key under which it was created, thereby making the communication anonymous. In this context, Abdalla, Bellare, and Neven [2] raised a fundamental question: how does a legitimate user know if an anonymous ciphertext is intended for him? Moreover, what happens if he uses his secret key on a ciphertext not created under his public key? To address this question, Abdalla et al. formalized a property called robustness, which (informally speaking) guarantees that decryption attempts fail with high probability if the "wrong" private key is used. They argued that, in all applications requiring anonymous public-key encryption, robustness is usually needed as well. These applications include auction protocols with bid privacy [28] , consistency [1] in searchable encryption [8] and anonymous broadcast encryption [3, 24] . As shown by Mohassel [25] , robustness is also important in guaranteeing the anonymity of hybrid encryption schemes resulting from the combination of anonymous asymmetric and symmetric components.
Strong robustness-also called SROB-CCA when the adversary has access to a decryption oracleallows for a more powerful adversary which chooses a ciphertext C (as opposed to a message which will be honestly encrypted) and two distinct public keys, and wins if C decrypts to a valid message under both corresponding secret keys. In [2] the need for this notion is motivated by scenarios where ciphertexts can be adversarially chosen. The authors of [2] give Sako's auction protocol [28] as an example of such a situation, explaining that strong robustness is required in order to prevent an attack on the fairness of this protocol by a cheating bidder and a colluding auctioneer.
As pointed out by Abdalla et al. [2] , merely appending the receiver's public key to the ciphertext is not an option for providing robustness, since it destroys key-privacy properties. Abdalla et al. also showed that the seemingly natural solution of using an unkeyed redundancy function to modify the message before encryption does not achieve even weak robustness, thus demonstrating the non-triviality of the problem. They then gave several anonymity-preserving constructions to obtain both weak and strong robustness for public-key encryption. Using a simple tweak, they also showed how to render the CramerShoup cryptosystem [13] strongly robust without introducing any overhead.
More recently, Mohassel [25] studied robustness in the context of hybrid encryption [14] . He showed that weak robustness (and not only anonymity) is needed in the asymmetric part of a hybrid encryption scheme to ensure anonymity of the overall scheme. Mohassel also considered relaxations, called collisionfreeness, of both weak and strong robustness. He showed that many constructions in the literature are natively collision-free and showed how to generically turn any weakly (resp., strongly) collision-free scheme into a weakly (resp., strongly) robust one.
Our contributions
The need for stronger definitions. In this paper, we argue that some applications require even stronger forms of robustness than those considered in [2, 25] . The first such application is, perhaps surprisingly, the construction of auction protocols with bid privacy, like that of Sako [28] . Recall that this was one of the initial motivations for analyzing robustness in [2] . Strong robustness actually turns out not to suffice for thwarting attacks against the fairness of Sako's auction protocol [28] : strong robustness assumes honestly generated public keys whereas, if the auctioneer can collude with cheating bidders (as assumed in [2] ), what really needs to be considered is an adversary who can maliciously generate ciphertexts and the public keys. To illustrate this, we show an attack on the fairness of Sako's protocol when instantiated with CS , a variant of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme which was proven to be key-private and strongly robust in [2] . This observation, then, motivates us to introduce notions of robustness where keys may be maliciously generated. We do not offer a full treatment of the delicate issue of fairness in auction protocols and its relation to robustness, since that is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, as with [2] , we use Sako's protocol as a motivation for introducing and studying stronger robustness notions.
The limitations of existing robustness notions, and therefore the motivation for this work, are not solely restricted to Sako's protocol. For instance, existing notions are not necessarily strong enough to provide robustness guarantees if the scheme is used to encrypt key-dependent messages [7] or messages encrypted under related keys [6] . This is because the adversary is denied access to the secret keys in these notions. The strongest of our new notions gives the adversary sufficient power and automatically provides robustness in these more challenging settings.
New notions of robustness and their relations. Our strongest new notion is called complete robustness (CROB) and is obtained by progressively removing various restrictions on adversarial capabilities in the strong robustness security model. First, we give access to honestly generated secret keys and arrive at an intermediate notion which we term unrestricted (strong) robustness (USROB). Next, we also remove the honest key-generation requirement to get to the notion of full robustness (or FROB for short). We then view robustness in terms of the behavior of the encryption and decryption algorithms with respect to each other, and obtain our CROB notion. Roughly speaking, in CROB, the adversary should not be able to find "collisions" in the scheme beyond those which are already implied by the correctness property of the scheme. For example, he should not be able to "explain" a ciphertext C of his choice as an encryption under two different adversarially chosen public keys pk 0 , pk 1 by revealing the plaintext and the encryption coins for pk 0 and the secret key sk 1 for pk 1 . As we will see, full robustness can be viewed as the "decryption-only part" of CROB. Another natural notion of robustness, which we call key-less robustness (KROB), arises as the dual notion corresponding to the "encryption-only part" of CROB, and is also implied by CROB. Finally, XROB is a "mixed" notion derived from FROB and KROB that has no natural interpretation but is a useful tool in establishing results about these notions.
We next study how these new notions of robustness relate to each other and to existing notions. Figure 1 summarizes the main relations that we prove between our new and existing robustness notions. In this figure, the lack of an implication between two notions should be interpreted as meaning that we prove a separation. Thus, for example, we will show that CROB is strictly stronger than FROB. It is apparent from the figure that we provide a complete account of the pairwise relations between the various robustness notions. In addition to these relations, we can prove several pairwise separations. For example, we will show that no two of the three notions from {FROB, KROB, XROB} are sufficient to prove CROB, but that their combination is. Thus we obtain a characterization of CROB in terms of the three intermediate notions.
These separations are not displayed in the figure for ease of visual presentation.
That robustness can come in so many flavors may be unsettling to some readers. Certainly, one should not seek to clutter the definitional landscape unnecessarily. Yet, with the exception of XROB, all of our notions arise as natural generalizations of the existing notions. Exploring their relations is then a natural endeavor. This is not so different from the situation for, say, confidentiality and anonymity notions for public-key encryption, where we now have many different security definitions and developing an understanding of their relations has taken several years.
Constructions of completely robust encryption. Having defined CROB and its weaker relatives, we prove it to be achievable via a variety of efficient and natural constructions.
We first show that the generic construction for strong robustness presented in [2] is already powerful enough as to also achieve CROB. Further, we observe that a slight modification of this transformation allows dispensing with the weak robustness assumption-which was necessary in [2] -on the underlying PKE scheme. Moreover, we point out that the random-oracle-based generic transformation of Mohassel [25] also achieves CROB.
In the standard model, we also answer in a positive sense a question left open in [2] as to whether the Canetti-Halevi-Katz [12] (CHK) paradigm-which is known to provide chosen-ciphertext secure cryptosystems from weakly secure identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes-can be leveraged to construct systems that are simultaneously anonymous and offer message privacy under chosen-ciphertext attacks (AI-CCA security) and are robust in a strong sense. Answering this question is non-trivial: Abdalla et al.
pinpointed that applying the one-time-signature-based CHK transformation to the Boyen-Waters IBE [11] , for example, does not provide SROB-CCA or even SROB-CPA. Here, we show how to obtain AI-CCAsecure, completely robust PKE schemes from weakly secure IBE schemes. Our construction is a variant of the Boneh-Katz construction for chosen-ciphertext security [9] , and it only requires the underlying IBE to satisfy a weak level of security under chosen-plaintext attacks. In comparison, the most powerful transformation of [2] must start from a scheme that is already AI-CCA-secure to achieve a comparable result. Because our technique simultaneously provides complete robustness and AI-CCA security, it enjoys better efficiency than applying the strongest robustness-conferring transformation of [2] to an AI-CCA-secure scheme obtained from the original Boneh-Katz transformation.
Finally, we also ask whether we can improve upon the efficiency of generic constructions with concrete schemes whose security rests on specific computational assumptions. By giving a concrete construction of a scheme that is CROB and AI-CCA-secure, we present a different and potentially more efficient way of directly achieving CROB for certain hybrid encryption schemes such as the Hofheinz-Kiltz [20] or Kurosawa-Desmedt [23] schemes. To do so, we take advantage of certain properties in the underlying symmetric components. Namely, we consider hybrid schemes that build on the encrypt-then-MAC paradigm in their symmetric part to obtain a suitably secure symmetric cipher. We show that, if the message authentication code (MAC) is what we call committing, then a simple modification in the hybrid scheme gives complete robustness without any significant computational overhead. The use of committing MACs readily extends as a tool to design AI-CCA-secure CROB hybrid constructions via the KEM/DEM framework [14] . Concretely, Mohassel [25] showed that the KEM/DEM framework gives an AI-CCA-secure hybrid encryption scheme when the KEM component is weakly robust and AI-CCA, and the DEM component is an authenticated symmetric encryption scheme. If the latter part is furthermore realized using the encryptthen-MAC approach with a committing MAC, we easily obtain complete robustness as well. As we will see, the committing MAC technique can also offer certain advantages.
Taken altogether, our constructions achieving CROB rely on different building blocks and, when fully instantiated, allow us to rely on a variety of different hardness assumptions. They demonstrate that CROB, while providing strong guarantees, is attainable in an efficient and flexible manner.
Organization. We start by reviewing the previous notions of robustness and highlighting their limitations in Section 2. Section 3 presents our new notions of robustness. In Section 4, we study the relations among notions of robustness. We describe our generic constructions in Section 5 and give an efficient construction in Section 6. We close by some concluding remarks in Section 7.
Previous Notions of Robustness and Their Limitations
We first briefly recall the existing notions of robustness, namely weak and strong robustness from [2] .
Weak and strong robustness
Let PKE = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec) be a public-key encryption scheme consisting of parameter-generation, keygeneration, encryption, and decryption algorithms (see Appendix A for the detailed syntax). The authors of [2] distinguish between weak robustness, where the adversary has to output a message and two public keys, and strong robustness, where it outputs a ciphertext and two public keys. The corresponding games are recalled in Figure 2 .
Strong robustness does not suffice for auction protocols
Sako's auction protocol [28] was the first practical protocol to ensure bid privacy, i.e., to hide the bids of losers. The basic idea is as follows. Let V = {v 1 , ..., v N } be the set of possible bid values. The auctioneer prepares N key-pairs (sk i , pk i ) i∈{1,...,N } and publishes the N public keys. To bid for a value v i a bidder encrypts a pre-determined message M under the public key pk i . This is signed and posted by the bidder. To open a bid the auctioneer attempts to decrypt the encrypted bids one by one using sk N . If at least one decrypts to M , the auctioneer publishes the winning bid v N , a list of all the winning bidders and the secret key sk N for the bidders to verify correctness of the result. If no decryption returns M , the auctioneer repeats the procedure using sk N −1 , and so on. For the auction to hide the bid values, the underlying public-key encryption scheme needs to be key-private, in the sense of [4] .
In [28] , Sako provided an example of an auction protocol scheme based on the ElGamal public-key encryption scheme, which is key-private. In [2] , Abdalla et al. gave an attack which allows a cheating bidder and a colluding auctioneer to break the fairness of the protocol. This attack is based on the fact that the ElGamal scheme is not robust and therefore the auctioneer can open the cheating bidder's bid to an arbitrary (winning) value. To prevent this attack, the authors of [2] suggest using any strongly robust scheme (strong robustness, instead of simply weak robustness, is required since the ciphertexts are generated adversarially).
We show that strong robustness is not sufficient to prevent an attack of the above type on Sako's protocol. More precisely, we present an attack on the protocol when it is instantiated with a variant of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme, CS , which is known to be key-private and strongly robust (the latter result was proved in [2] ). Just as with the attack of Abdalla et al. [2] , the attack we present assumes a cheating bidder and a colluding auctioneer. The key idea behind the attack (which is presented in detail in Appendix C) is that an auctioneer can maliciously prepare the public keys so that the cheating bidder's encryption decrypts to M under any secret key.
This attack shows that strong robustness is not enough to guarantee fairness in Sako's auction protocol. Intuitively what is needed here is a form of robustness wherein all the public keys and ciphertexts in the system may be adversarially generated. In the coming sections we will formalize stronger notions of robustness which rule out such attacks.
New Notions of Robustness

A direct strengthening: full robustness
Recall that an SROB adversary has to output a ciphertext C and two public keys pk 0 and pk 1 such that C decrypts to a message M 0 under (sk 0 , pk 0 ) and a message M 1 under (sk 1 , pk 1 ). The notion poses three restrictions on the adversary: (1) pk 0 and pk 1 have to be distinct; (2) The corresponding secret keys cannot have been queried by the adversary; (3) The public keys are honestly generated.
The first condition is inherent to modeling the behavior of an encryption scheme when used on different public keys, and removing it would make it trivial for an adversary to win.
We now look at the notion resulting from the removal of the second restriction, i.e., when the adversary is allowed to query secret keys even for the finally output public keys. We call this notion unrestricted strong robustness (USROB). This game therefore proceeds as the SROB game does except that the check (id 0 ∈ V ) ∨ (id 1 ∈ V ) is no longer present in the Finalize procedure. This notion is powerful enough to model scenarios where keys are honestly generated, but an adversary may know the secret keys. This, for example, includes robustness for the encryption of key-dependent messages as discussed in the introduction.
However, as we have seen in the previous section, if an adversary can control the generation of keys, it may be unreasonable to assume that it can only generate the keys honestly. We therefore can strengthen USROB further by removing the third restriction on the adversary. We, however, ask the adversary to return secret keys for the public keys that it chooses. Two points deserve further attention at this point. First, returning the secret keys is to allow for a polynomial-time game definition which is not excessively strong. Second, we do not require the secret keys to be valid. Indeed, it is the responsibility of the decryption algorithm to check that the key-pair it receives is valid. Note that as a result of removing the two restrictions, the adversary has now full control over the keys, and we no longer need to provide the adversary with the oracles present in the SROB and USROB games. These modifications result in a simple, but strong, notion we call full robustness (FROB), and formalize in Figure 3 . 
A unified approach: complete robustness
At this point it can be asked if there are attacks which fall outside the FROB model. To answer this question, we take a somewhat different approach towards robustness and view it in terms of the behavior of the encryption and decryption routines of a scheme with respect to each other. In fact, this is the underlying intuition behind not only the original weak robustness notion, 5 but also the standard correctness criterion for a PKE scheme (albeit for a single key). This leads us to a new notion which we term complete robustness (CROB). In this game the shared parameters of the system are passed to an adversary, which then arbitrarily interacts with the encryption and decryption routines on plaintexts, ciphertexts, keys, and even random coins of its choice. Its goal is to find an "unexpected collision" in the cryptosystem (i.e., one outside that imposed by the correctness criterion). We formalize the CROB game in Figure 4 .
Key-less robustness. It can be seen through an easy inspection that full robustness is a sub-case of complete robustness where the adversary is restricted to querying the Dec oracle. One can also consider the dual case where the adversary only queries the Enc oracle. This results in a new notion which we call key-less robustness (KROB). Key-less robustness differs from full robustness in that an adversary no longer needs to return any secret keys, but instead "opens" a ciphertext by providing the random coins and the message used in the encryption. More precisely, the adversary outputs two messages, two distinct public keys and two sets of random coins, and its goal is to invoke a collision in the encryption algorithm. The game is shown in Figure 5 . Fig. 4 . Game defining complete robustness.
proc Initialize pars ←$ PG Return pars proc Finalize(M0, M1, pk 0 , pk 1 , r0, r1) // KROB If (pk 0 = pk 1 ) Then Return F C0 ← Enc(pars, M0, pk 0 ; r0) C1 ← Enc(pars, M1, pk 1 ; r1) Return (C0 = C1 =⊥) Intuitively this notion appears to be the strongest amongst the ones considered so far, since the adversary has the liberty to choose the public keys and does not have to reveal any secret information. Surprisingly, we will see that key-less robustness does not imply any other of the other notions considered so far (FROB, SROB, and not even weak robustness). Furthermore, we will show that FROB does not imply KROB either. In the next section we give a complete treatment of relations among different notions.
Identity-based encryption. In the IBE setting the identities (analogous to public keys in the PKE setting) are already chosen maliciously, while the natural extension of our notions would allow the adversary to also choose the IBE master keys maliciously. In particular, the identity-based analogue of FROB would be strong enough to guarantee well-addressedness according to the definition proposed by Hofheinz and Weinreb [21] (see also Figure 9 in Appendix B), whereas SROB-CCA may not always do so. We leave the further development of the ID-based setting to future work.
Relations among Notions of Robustness
We now study how the various notions of robustness relate to each other. Starting with complete robustness, it may be asked if KROB and FROB are strong enough together to jointly imply CROB. We show that this is not the case. Indeed, there is a third "mixed" notion of robustness implicit in CROB, which we term XROB and formalize in Figure 6 . As the next theorem shows, the XROB notion is necessary in the sense that it is not implied by KROB and FROB together.
In fact, no pair of the notions from {FROB, KROB, XROB} implies the third. Furthermore, the conjunction of all three notions is sufficient to imply CROB.
Theorem 1 (CROB Characterization).
A PKE scheme is CROB if and only if it is simultaneously FROB, KROB, and XROB. Furthermore, no combination of at most two of FROB, KROB, and XROB is sufficient to provide the CROB guarantees.
We prove the theorem via a sequence of propositions in Appendix E. To give a flavor of our results we present one of these next.
Proposition 1 (FROB ∧ KROB =⇒ XROB). Let PKE be a public-key encryption scheme which is FROB and KROB. Then there is a scheme PKE which is FROB and KROB, but fails to be XROB.
Proof. We define the required scheme PKE as follows. KG (pars): Run KG(pars) to obtain (sk , pk ). Return (sk , 0 pk ). Enc (pars, b pk , M ; r): Run Enc(pars, pk , M ; r) to obtain C. Output b C. Dec (pars, b pk , sk , c C): If b = 1 return ⊥. If c = 1 return a fixed (e.g., the lexicographically smallest) message M in the message space for pk . Else return Dec(pars, pk , sk , C).
Note that PKE is a correct public-key encryption scheme. We show PKE is not XROB. Consider the XROB adversary A which obtains pars, generates a key-pair (sk , 0 pk ) and a set of coins r for the encryption algorithm, and returns (M, 1 pk , r, 1 C, 0 pk , sk ) where M is any valid message and C := Enc(pars, pk , M ; r). This tuple wins the XROB game with probability 1 as 1 pk = 0 pk , the output of Enc (pars, 1 pk , M ; r) is 1 C, and the output of Dec (pars, 0 pk ,
It is easy to see that PKE is still KROB. Indeed, since Enc attaches the first bit of its input public key to the ciphertext, if a collision in the output of Enc for two distinct public keys arises, it must be that the public keys have the same starting bit and hence they must be differing in their remaining parts. This then translates into a KROB attack on the underlying scheme PKE.
To see that the modified scheme is also FROB, observe that no adversary can win the FROB game by outputting any public key whose starting bit is a 1 as otherwise the decryption algorithm will reject. Therefore the public keys must start with a 0, and as before, in a successful FROB attack the remaining parts of the public keys must be differing. Now since the leading bit, c, of the ciphertexts does not affect Dec , we also obtain an FROB attack on the starting scheme PKE.
It is natural to study how our new notions relate to the existing notions from Abdalla et al. [2] . Since USROB is a natural intermediate notion, for the sake of completeness, we also investigate where it stands in relation to existing notions. We start by observing that FROB =⇒ USROB =⇒ SROB-CCA as the adversary becomes progressively more restricted in each game. Moreover, in the first part of the following theorem, we show that USROB is strictly stronger than SROB-CCA, and that FROB is strictly stronger than USROB. In the second part of the theorem we show that KROB does not even imply WROB-CPA, separating this notion from all notions other than complete robustness. Finally, we show that XROB implies WROB-CCA but not SROB-CPA. Hence XROB can be seen a strengthened version of weak robustness in a direction orthogonal to strong robustness.
Theorem 2 (Relation with WROB and SROB). Let PKE be a PKE scheme. We have the following.
-FROB: If PKE is FROB, then it is also USROB. If PKE is USROB then it is also SROB-CCA.
Moreover, these implications are strict. -KROB: KROB does not imply WROB-CPA and SROB-CCA does not imply KROB.
-XROB: If PKE is XROB, then it is also WROB-CCA. Furthermore, XROB does not imply SROB-CPA and SROB-CCA does not imply XROB.
We prove the theorem in Appendix F. The results of [2] together with Theorems 1 and 2 resolve all the relations between any pair of robustness notions as we have summarized in Figure 1 . For example, to see that KROB =⇒ FROB, we use the facts that FROB =⇒ SROB-ATK but KROB ∧ XROB =⇒ SROB-ATK. Moreover, although we do not formally prove it here, all our separating examples are designed such that they preserve the AI-ATK security of the underlying PKE schemes. Hence Figure 1 also applies in the presence of AI-ATK security.
Generic Constructions of Completely Robust Public-key Encryption
Mohassel's transformation
Mohassel [25] gives a generic transformation in the random-oracle model that converts an AI-ATK encryption scheme into one which is SROB-CCA without compromising its AI-ATK security. This construction also achieves complete robustness. In this construction, the hash value H(pk , r, M ), where r is the randomness used in the encryption, is attached to ciphertexts. This immediately rules out all forms of collisions between ciphertexts, as the hash values are unlikely to collide on two distinct public keys.
The ABN transformation
In [2, Theorem 4.2] the authors give a generic construction for a scheme PKE which confers strong robustness and preserves the AI-ATK security of the starting scheme PKE, provided that the latter scheme is additionally WROB. We briefly describe how the transformation works, and refer the reader to the original work for the details. At setup, include in pars for PKE the parameters of a commitment scheme (see Appendix G for the definitions). When encrypting, commit to the public key, and encrypt the de-commitment along with the message. Also include the commitment as a ciphertext component. Decryption checks the commitment/de-commitment pair for consistency and rejects if this is not the case. We strengthen the result of [2] , showing that this construction achieves complete robustness:
Theorem 3 (The ABN Transformation Achieves CROB). Let A be a PPT CROB adversary against PKE. Then there exist PPT adversaries B 1 , B 2 , and B 3 against the binding property of CMT such that
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix H, where we show scheme PKE is simultaneously FROB, KROB, and XROB.
A modification of the ABN transformation
While the original transformation [2] does provide AI-ATK and CROB guarantees, the AI-ATK security of the transformed scheme PKE relies on the weak robustness of the underlying encryption scheme PKE in the case of chosen-ciphertext adversaries (i.e., when ATK = CCA). We show that, if the underlying encryption scheme supports labels [29] (in which case the encryption and decryption algorithms both take an additional public string L as input; see Appendix A), this assumption can be eliminated and we only need PKE to be AI-ATK-secure.
Although the weak robustness assumption is not too demanding in theory (since any encryption scheme can be made weakly robust by means of a keyed redundancy-based transformation [2] ), our construction provides better efficiency in some settings since many AI-CCA encryption schemes, such as the CramerShoup or the Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme, natively support labels. 6 Our transformation, which relies on a commitment scheme CMT = (CPG, Com, Ver), is as follows.
PG(1 λ ): Run pars ←$ PG(1 λ ) to obtain public parameters pars for PKE. Then, generate cpars ←$ CPG(1 λ ) for CMT . Finally, return (pars, cpars). KG(pars, cpars): Compute and return (sk , pk ) ←$ KG(pars).
Enc (pars, cpars), pk , M : The algorithm proceeds in two steps.
1. Commit to pk by computing a pair (com, dec) ←$ Com(cpars, pk ). 2. Encrypt M dec under the label L = com by computing C ←$ Enc(pars, pk , M dec, L). Return (C, com) as the final ciphertext. Dec (pars, cpars), pk , sk , (C, com) : The algorithm proceeds in two steps.
1. Compute M ← Dec pars, pk , sk , (C, com), L , with L = com. Then, parse M as M dec (and return ⊥ if M cannot be parsed properly). 2. Return M if Ver(cpars, pk , com, dec) = 1. Else return ⊥.
Theorem 4, whose proof is in Appendix I, shows that thanks to the use of labels, we do not have to rely on any weaker form of robustness of PKE when proving the AI-ATK security of PKE.
Theorem 4.
If PKE is AI-ATK-secure and CMT is a hiding commitment, then PKE is AI-ATK-secure. More precisely, for any PPT AI-ATK adversary A against PKE, there exists a PPT AI-ATK adversary B 1 against PKE and a PPT distinguisher B 2 against CMT such that
Furthermore, the above construction is CROB if CMT is a binding commitment. More precisely, for any PPT CROB adversary A, there exists a PPT adversary B against the binding property of the commitment scheme such that Adv
Completely robust AI-CCA-secure PKE from selectively secure IBE
Next, we present a modification of the Boneh-Katz approach [9] which provides both CROB and AI-CCA security when applied to any IBE scheme that only provides TA anonymity in the multi-authority selective-ID setting (or sID-TAA-CPA security, as defined in Appendix J). In particular, this positively answers the question of whether CHK-like techniques can be used to achieve a strong flavor of robustness from weakly secure IBE. Let IBE be an sID-TAA-CPA secure IBE scheme. We obtain a completely robust AI-CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme PKE by combining IBE with a strongly secure message authentication code MAC and a trapdoor commitment scheme T CMT .
Recall that a trapdoor commitment scheme T CMT = (CPG, Com, Ver, Equiv) consists of efficient algorithms where (CPG, Com, Ver) function as in an ordinary commitment except that CPG outputs public parameters cpars and a trapdoor td . In addition, Equiv allows equivocating a commitment using the trapdoor td : for any two messages m 1 , m 2 and any tuple (com, dec 1 ) produced as (com, dec 1 ) ←$ Com(cpars, m 1 ), the trapdoor td allows computing dec 2 ←$ Equiv(td , com, m 1 , dec 1 , m 2 ) such that Ver(cpars, com, m 2 , dec 2 ) = 1. Moreover, (com, dec 2 ) has the same distribution as Com(cpars, m 2 ).
Our IBE-based construction PKE = (PG, KG, Enc, Dec) is as follows.
PG(1 λ ): Run pars ←$ IBE.PG(1 λ ) to obtain common public parameters pars. Also run cpars ←$ CPG(1 λ ) to obtain public parameters for a trapdoor commitment scheme T CMT . Then, choose a message authentication code MAC with key length ∈ poly(λ). Finally, return (pars, cpars, MAC). KG(pars, cpars, MAC): Generate a master key pair (msk , mpk ) ←$ IBE.MPG(pars) for IBE. Return the key pair (sk , pk ) := (msk , mpk ). Enc (pars, cpars, MAC), pk , M : To encrypt M under pk = mpk , the algorithm proceeds as follows.
1. Choose a random MAC key k ←$ {0, 1} . 2. Commit to mpk k by computing a pair (com, dec) ←$ Com(cpars, mpk k).
3. Encrypt M k dec under the identity com by computing C ←$ IBE.Enc(pars, mpk , com, M k dec).
4. Compute tag = MacGen k (C) and return (C, com, tag) as the final ciphertext.
Dec (pars, cpars, MAC), pk , sk , (C, com, tag) : Given pk = mpk and sk = msk , conduct the following steps. 1. Compute dk com ←$ IBE.KG(pars, msk , com) and then M ← IBE.Dec pars, mpk , dk com , com, C . Then, parse M as M k dec (and return ⊥ if M =⊥ or if M cannot be parsed properly). 2. If MacVer k C, tag = 1 and Ver(cpars, mpk k, com, dec) = 1, return M . Otherwise, return ⊥.
A difference with the original Boneh-Katz construction-which can use a weak form of commitment called encapsulation-is that our construction requires a full-fledged commitment scheme. This is because, in order to achieve complete robustness, we need to commit to the master public key of the scheme at the same time as the MAC key in the encryption algorithm. Moreover, the proof of AI-CCA security requires the commitment to be a trapdoor commitment: the trapdoor plays an essential role when it comes to reduce the sID-TAA-CPA security of the IBE to the AI-CCA security of the encryption scheme.
The proof of the following theorem can be found in Appendix J.
Theorem 5.
If IBE is sID-TAA-CPA-secure, MAC is strongly unforgeable, and T CMT is a computationally binding trapdoor commitment scheme, then PKE is AI-CCA-secure. Moreover, the scheme PKE is CROB if T CMT is computationally binding.
A Concrete CROB Scheme
In this section, we describe a simple way to achieve complete robustness using hybrid encryption where the symmetric component uses the encrypt-then-MAC approach. To this end, we require the MAC to satisfy a "MAC analogue" of the notion of committing symmetric encryption [17] . Informally this notion requires that a given MAC tag is valid for a single message regardless of the key used.
Committing MAC. We say MAC = (MacGen, MacVer) is committing if for any message m and any key k, there exists no message-key pair (m , k ) such that m = m and MacVer k (m , MacGen k (m)) = 1.
We also need the MAC to computationally hide the message. Note that the following definition is implied by the definition of message-hiding security used in [15, Definition 2.2].
Indistinguishable MAC. We say that a message authentication code MAC = (MacGen, MacVer) with key space KSp provides indistinguishability if, for any two messages m 0 , m 1 , it is computationally infeasible to distinguish the distributions
For our purposes, the MAC only has to provide one-time strong unforgeability. Namely, the adversary is allowed to see one pair of the form (m, tag), where tag = MacGen k (m), and should not be able to produce a pair (m , tag ) such that (m , tag ) = (m, tag) and MacVer k (m , tag ) = 1.
Using ideas from [17] , it is easy to construct a MAC which is simultaneously committing, indistinguishable, and strongly unforgeable. The idea is to use a family of injective and key-binding pseudorandom functions: for any distinct keys k 1 , k 2 , the functions f k 1 (·) and f k 2 (·) have disjoint ranges, i.e., there exist no two pairs (k 1 , x 1 ), (k 2 , x 2 ) such that k 1 = k 2 and f k 1 (x 1 ) = f k 2 (x 2 ). The key space of the MAC is that of the PRF. For any message m = 1 λ , the MAC generation computes and outputs the pair (f k (1 λ ), f k (m)). The first component serves as a perfectly binding commitment to the key k while the injectivity of f k (·) guarantees that the MAC is only valid for one message. In addition, its strong unforgeability and indistinguishability properties are both implied by the pseudorandomness of {f k } k as long as the message space of the MAC, MSp mac , does not include 1 λ (the proof is straightforward). We show a simple variant of the Hofheinz-Kiltz (HK) hybrid encryption scheme [20] that provides CROB and AI-CCA security when the underlying authenticated symmetric encryption scheme uses a MAC with the aforementioned properties. Besides providing new ways to achieve robustness, our scheme comes with the advantage that its computational efficiency is the same as the original HK scheme and in particular it is more efficient than combining HK with a commitment using the ABN transformation.
PG(1 λ ): Choose a group G of prime order p > 2 λ with g ←$ G. Also, choose a symmetric encryption scheme (E, D) of key length 0 and a message authentication code MAC = (MacGen, MacVer) of key length is the message space of MAC. The public parameters consist of pars := G, p, g, (E, D), MAC, TCR, KDF, H . KG(pars): Choose x, y, z ←$ Z * p and compute u = g x , v = g y , and h = g z . The public key is pk = u, v, h and the private key is sk = (x, y, z) ∈ (Z * p ) 3 . Enc pars, pk , M : To encrypt M under the public key pk , choose s ←$ Z * p and compute
where
The scheme was known to be IND-CCA-secure. We are also able to prove that it provides AI-CCA security, essentially because the ciphertexts can be shown to be indistinguishable from dummy ciphertexts that are statistically independent of the public key, even in the presence of a decryption oracle. Proofs of the following results may be found in Appendix K.
Theorem 6. The scheme provides AI-CCA security assuming that: (1) The DDH assumption holds in G; (2) (E, D) is a semantically secure symmetric encryption scheme; (3) KDF is a secure key-derivation function; 8 (4) MAC is a one-time strongly unforgeable MAC and provides indistinguishability; (5) H and TCR are collision-resistant and target collision-resistant, respectively. Furthermore, the scheme is CROB if H is collision-resistant and MAC is committing.
Interestingly, if the construction of Section 5.4 is modified to use a committing MAC, it can be instantiated using any commitment scheme and in particular a perfectly binding commitment or even an encapsulation scheme (as in the original Boneh-Katz construction) also work. In this case, the sender no longer needs to commit to the master public key: (com, dec) is generated by committing to the MAC key only. Instead, the sender computes tag as tag = MacGen k (H(C, mpk )) using a collision-resistant hash function H. If the MAC is committing, the resulting construction is easily seen to provide complete robustness. It also remains AI-CCA-secure provided the MAC satisfies the notion of indistinguishability.
Closing Remarks
Motivated in part by the shortcomings of existing definitions of robustness, we have made a thorough exploration of the landscape of robustness definitions and their relations, and given a suite of flexible and efficient methods for obtaining completely robust AI-CCA-secure public-key encryption schemes. In future work, one could explore the situation in the ID-based setting. Another open question, well beyond the remit of this paper, is to formalize the fairness of auctions and formally prove that our CROB notion is strong enough to ensure this property for Sako's protocol or its variants. 
A (Labeled) PKE Schemes and AI-ATK Security
We recall the syntax of a (labeled) public-key encryption scheme. We chose not to use the syntax of a Generalized Encryption (GE) scheme [2] , which simultaneously formalizes PKE and IBE schemes, for two reasons. First, we will be mainly treating the robustness of public-key encryption schemes in this paper. Second, the GE syntax is not flexible enough to allow defining the identity-based analogs of the notions that we present for PKE schemes.
Labeled public-key encryption. A labeled public-key encryption scheme [29] is defined through a four-tuple of algorithms as follows.
1. PG(1 λ ): This is the parameter generation algorithm. On input a security parameter λ ∈ N, it outputs a set pars of common public parameters shared by all users in the scheme. 2. KG(pars): This is the key generation algorithm. On input of the public parameters pars, it outputs a key-pair (sk , pk ). Implicit in pk are descriptions of the message space MSp and the label space LSp. 3. Enc(pars, pk , M, L): This is the encryption algorithm. On input of the public parameters pars, a public key pk , a message M , and a label L, it outputs a ciphertext C or the special error symbol ⊥. 4. Dec(pars, pk , sk , C, L): This is the encryption algorithm. On input of the public parameters pars, a public key pk , a secret key sk , a ciphertext C, and a label L, it outputs a message M or the special error symbol ⊥.
A (standard) public-key encryption scheme is a labeled public-key encryption where LSp = { }.
AI security. We recall the definition of AI-CCA security given in [2] and extend it to the case of encryption schemes with labels. This notion models the usual IND-CCA and anonymity (also known as key-privacy) of a PKE scheme in a single game. The advantage of an adversary in the AI-ATK game is defined in the usual way: Adv ai-atk
where game AI-ATK is shown in Figure 7 . Note that we omit the security parameter from the games, and deal with concrete security. Correctness. We call scheme PKE correct if for any λ ∈ N, any pars ←$ PG(1 λ ), any (sk , pk ) ←$ KG(pars), any M ∈ MSp, any L ∈ LSp, and any C ←$ Enc(pars, pk , M, L), we have that Dec(pars, pk , sk , C, L) = M .
Correctness definitions do not specify how the cryptosystem behaves should the incorrect key pair be used upon decryption. They are merely a property of the scheme when decryption is run on the correct keys. Robustness definitions, on the other hand, model how this behavior on different keys, and were implicit in a number of works prior to [2] . We briefly recall a number of robustness notions that exist in the literature.
B Collision Freeness and Well-addressedness
Collision freeness. This notion was introduced in [25] and captures the idea that a ciphertext should decrypt to two distinct messages when decrypted using two distinct secret keys. While this notion seems to be of standalone interest only in limited scenarios (in the case of expected messages for example) The author considers both weak and strong collision freeness, both in the CPA and CCA setting (in the former case there is no access to the Dec procedure). These notions were introduced as intermediate steps to achieve strong robustness. The corresponding games are described in Figure 8 . Note that, since it requires the two messages to also collide (as well as being valid), collision freeness can be considered as a relaxation of the notion of robustness (which only requires validity).
Strong correctness. The notion of strong correctness was introduced by Barth et al. [3] . This notion is similar to the weak robustness notion except that the adversary is required to output the message before receiving the public parameters of the system. This notion is therefore is even weaker than WROB. As it this notion is about two public keys, in our view it is not a "correctness" condition.
Well-addressedness. This notion was introduced By Hofheinz and Weinreb [21] and has applications in the context of public-key encryption with keyword search. This notion is defined for identity-based encryption schemes, and is incomparable to strong robustness for IBE schemes. We have included the proc Initialize pars ←$ PG (sk 0, pk 0 ) ←$ KG(pars) (sk 1, pk 1 ) ←$ KG(pars) Return (pars, pk 0 , pk 1 )
proc Finalize(C) // Strong collision freeness M0 ← Dec(pars, pk 0 , sk 0, C) M1 ← Dec(pars, pk 1 , sk 1, C) Return (M0 =⊥) ∧ (M1 =⊥) ∧ (M0 = M1) Fig. 8 . Games defining (two-user) weak/strong collision freeness.
definition below. As we shall see, the ID-analogues of notion of robustness that we introduce are strong enough to imply well-addressedness. 
C On the Fairness of Sako's Protocol using SROB Encryption Schemes
We first recall the CS scheme. The common public parameters for CS consist of a group G of prime order p and the description of a family of functions H : Keys(H) × G 3 → G. The algorithms of CS are as follows:
The public key is pk = (e, f, h) and the private key is sk = (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 , z 1 , z 2 ).
Enc(pars, pk , M ): To encrypt a message M ∈ G,
The ciphertext is C = (a 1 , a 2 , c, d ).
Dec(pars, pk , sk , C): Parse the ciphertext C as (a 1 , a 2 , c, d) . a 1 , a 2 , c) ), M ← c · a
The attack works as follows. Let V = {v 1 , ..., v N } be the set of possible bid values. The auctioneer runs PG to obtain the public parameters (K, g 1 , g 2 ). He chooses a fixed message M ∈ G as per Sako's protocol.
He selects u, z 1 , z 2 , α 1 , α 2 ← Z * p and computes
2 . He then computes v = H (K, (a 1 , a 2 , c) ). If v = 0, the auctioneer re-samples and re-computes the values, until v = 0. He then considers the following system of multivariate linear equations
and finds N solutions (x i 1 , x i 2 , y i 1 , y i 2 ) with i ∈ {1, ..., N }, where all the values are in Z p .
The auctioneer sets sk i to be (x i 1 , x i 2 , y i 1 , y i 2 , z 1 , z 2 ) for i ∈ {1, ..., N }. He passes u to the cheating bidder and publishes all the public keys pk i = (g
2 ) with i ∈ {1, ..., N }. The cheating bidder can now bid for the value v i by encrypting M with randomness u under the public key pk i to get ciphertext C. Such an encrypted bid C will decrypt to M under any sk j with j ∈ {1, ..., N }, since x i 1 + vy i 1 = x j 1 + vy j 1 and x i 2 + vy i 2 = x j 2 + vy j 2 , by construction. This means that during the protocol, the auctioneer can first observe the highest honest bid (say h < N ). Then, he can declare the cheating bidder as the winner (for the bid h + 1) by revealing the private key sk h+1 . This clearly gives the dishonest bidder and colluding auctioneer a cheating strategy and breaks the fairness of the protocol. Remark 1. It may be argued that the above attack can be detected by the bidders, as the maliciously generated public keys share the same third component. Although this is a valid point, it may be unreasonable to assume that the bidders perform such checks outside the protocol description. Indeed, one (or the) goal of robustness is to ensure that such checks are already implemented within the decryption algorithm. Let us note that the attack of Abdalla et al. on the robustness of ElGamal also falls within the category of such "traceable" attacks, as the ciphertexts are of the form (1, C). Despite this, and in order to further justify the relevance of the new notions, we demonstrate in Appendix D an untraceable attack on the modified Kurosawa-Desmedt encryption scheme (which was proven strongly robust under chosen-ciphertext attacks in [24]).
Remark 2. The alert reader might notice that, if the auctioneer is allowed to collude with bidders, then other, more direct attacks on the protocol are possible: indeed, the auctioneer can first decrypt all honest bidders' ciphertexts and tell the cheating bidder what his incremental bid has to be. These attacks can all be prevented, informally at least, by having all players initially send a commitment to their ciphertexts (as already suggested in [2, Appendix C]), so that a colluding bidder and auctioneer do not see honest bidders' ciphertexts before a cheating bid is sent. In contrast, our attack works even in this case.
D A Variant of Kurosawa-Desmedt Is SROB-CCA but Not CROB
We recall the Kurosawa-Desmedt (KD) cryptosystem [23] . Here, the common public parameters consist of a group G of prime order p > 2 λ , with generators g 1 , g 2 ∈ R G. They also include the description of a universal one-way hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z p , a key-derivation function KDF : G → {0, 1} k , for some integer k ∈ poly(1 λ ), a symmetric authenticated encryption scheme (E, D) of key length k.
KG(pars):
Given common public parameters pars = (G, g 1 , g 2 , H), choose x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ←$ Z p and compute
The public key is pk = (e, f ) and the private key is sk = (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ). Enc(pars, pk , M ): To encrypt a message M ∈ G, 1. Pick u ←$ Z p and compute
The ciphertext is C = (a 1 , a 2 , c).
Dec(pars, pk , sk , C): Parse the ciphertext C as (a 1 , a 2 , c).
, and K = KDF(d) ∈ {0, 1} k . Then, return m = D K (c) (which may be ⊥ if c fails to properly decrypt under the key K).
The above algorithms describe the original Kurosawa-Desmedt encryption scheme. Following [2] , we denote by KD the modified KD scheme where the encryption exponent u = 0 is explicitly disallowed: namely, the sender chooses u ←$ Z * p (instead of u ←$ Z p ) at encryption and the receiver outputs ⊥ upon receiving a ciphertext (a 1 , a 2 , c) such that a 1 = 1 G . We prove in [24] that KD is strongly robust (with some conditions on the symmetric components).
We will next see that KD is not fully robust (and hence neither completely robust). We construct an adversary A which gets as input pars, picks m ←$ G and u, α 1 , α 2 ←$ Z * p . It then computes
Now consider the following system of multivariate linear equations
Unless v = 0 such system has an infinite number of solutions. (In the case v = 0, A re-samples u). In particular, let (x 10 , x 20 , y 10 , y 20 ) and (x 11 , x 21 , y 11 , y 21 ) be two integer solutions to the system. Now A sets pk = (e, f ) and pk = (e , f ) to be e = g a 1 , a 2 , c) . Its output for the full robustness game will be C, pk , pk , sk , sk . By the choice of sk and sk , it is clear that C, decrypted under both secret keys, will return a valid message M =⊥ with probability 1.
In [24] , the KD scheme was proved SROB-CCA assuming that the key-derivation function is collisionresistant and that the symmetric encryption scheme is key binding (i.e., each ciphertext is only valid for one key). Even when these conditions are satisfied, the above attack still works since both keys recover the same d = a
When KD is used to implement the auction protocol of [28] , this attack is much harder to detect than that of Section 2.2 and the one of [2] : the only apparent way to make it evident is to audit the entire system and force the auctioneer to reveal all private keys.
E Proof of the Characterization Theorem
We prove the theorem via a sequence of propositions as follows.
Proposition 2 (CROB ⇐⇒ FROB ∧ KROB ∧ XROB).
A PKE scheme is CROB if and only if it is simultaneously FROB, KROB, and XROB.
Proof. For the forward direction, suppose there is an adversary which wins one of the FROB, KROB, or XROB games. Then this adversary also wins the CROB game by querying the FROB winning tuples to the Dec oracle, the KROB winning tuples to the Enc oracle, and finally the first XROB winning tuple to the Enc oracle and the second to the Dec oracle.
For the backward direction, note that a pair of winning tuples for the CROB game can arise in one of three possible ways: (1) Both tuples were added to the list through decryption queries. This translates into a winning output for an FROB adversary; (2) Both tuples were added to the list through encryption queries. This translates into a winning output for a KROB adversary; (3) One tuple was added to the list through an encryption query and the other through a decryption query. This translates into a winning output for an XROB adversary.
For the first separation, we prove the stronger statement that KROB and XROB together are insufficient to guarantee SROB-CPA (and hence also fail to imply FROB). As we shall see in Proposition 8, we have that XROB =⇒ WROB-CCA, and hence this is the "best separation" one can hope for.
Proposition 3 (KROB ∧ XROB =⇒ SROB-CPA). Let PKE be a public-key encryption scheme which is KROB and XROB. Then there is a scheme PKE which is KROB and XROB, but fails to be SROB-CPA.
Proof. We define the required scheme PKE to be identical to PKE except for its encryption and decryption algorithms, which we modify as follows:
Enc (pars, pk , M ): Run Enc(pars, pk , M ) to obtain ciphertext C. Return 0 C. Dec (pars, pk , sk , c C): If c = 0 return Dec(pars, pk , sk , C). If c = 1 return a fixed (e.g., the lexicographically smallest) message M in the message space for pk .
Note that PKE is a correct public-key encryption scheme. Scheme PKE is not SROB-CPA. Consider the adversary A which queries GetEK twice to obtain, with overwhelming probability, two distinct public keys pk 0 and pk 1 . Now A picks a random C from the ciphertext space and gives (1 C, pk 0 , pk 1 ) as its final output. It is easy to see that A wins with an overwhelming probability: pk 0 = pk 1 and the decryption of 1 C always returns a valid message by construction.
Next we show PKE is still KROB. It is easy to see that the tweaks in the modified scheme do not affect the KROB game, since the new encryption algorithm prepends a zero-bit to all ciphertexts.
In order to show that PKE is still XROB, suppose an adversary A(pars) outputs a winning tuple (M, pk 0 , r 0 , C 1 , pk 1 , sk 1 ), where pk 0 and pk 1 are two distinct public keys. Note it must be the case that C 1 = 0 C 1 , as otherwise A cannot win the XROB game (M is encrypted using Enc in the game). Now an adversary B can win the XROB game for PKE by outputting (M, pk 0 , r 0 ,C 1 , pk 1 , sk 1 ).
Proposition 4 (FROB ∧ XROB =⇒ KROB).
Let PKE be a public-key encryption scheme which is FROB and XROB. Then there is a scheme PKE which is FROB and XROB, but fails to be KROB.
Proof. We define the required scheme PKE as follows.
PG (1 λ ): Run PG(1 λ ) to obtain pars. Return pars. KG (pars): Run KG(pars) to obtain (sk , pk ). Return (sk , 0 pk ). Note that PKE is a correct public-key encryption scheme. To see that PKE is not KROB, note that an adversary which outputs 1 pk 0 and 1 pk 1 , for two valid public keys pk 1 and pk 0 wins the KROB game (for any pair of messages and any pair of random coins) as the resulting ciphertext in both cases is 1 λ .
Next we show that PKE is still FROB Suppose an adversary A(pars) outputs a winning tuple (c C, b 0 pk 0 , b 1 pk 1 , sk 0 , sk 1 ), where b 0 pk 0 and b 1 pk 1 are two distinct public keys. Note it must be the case that b 0 = b 1 = 0, as otherwise decryption rejects and A cannot win the FROB game. Therefore it is necessarily the case that pk 0 = pk 1 , and an adversary B can also win the FROB game against PKE by outputting (C, pk 0 , pk 1 , sk 0 , sk 1 ).
In order to show that PKE is also XROB, suppose an adversary A(pars) outputs a winning tuple (M, b 0 pk 0 , r 0 , c C, b 1 pk 1 , sk 1 ) , where b 0 pk 0 and b 1 pk 1 are two distinct public keys. We must have that b 1 = 0 and c = 0 as otherwise decryption rejects. We must also have that b 0 = c, as the first bit of a ciphertext output by encryption matches the first bit of the public key. Therefore b 0 = b 1 = c = 0, and an adversary B can also win the XROB game against PKE by outputting (M, pk 0 , r 0 , C, pk 1 , sk 1 ).
These propositions, together with Proposition 1, complete the proof of Theorem 1.
F Relation with WROB and SROB
It is clear that FROB =⇒ USROB =⇒ SROB-CCA as the adversary becomes progressively more restricted in each game. We prove the rest of the theorem via a sequence of propositions.
Proposition 5 (USROB =⇒ FROB).
Let PKE be a public-key encryption scheme which is USROB. Then there is a scheme PKE which is USROB, but fails to be FROB.
PG (1 λ ): Run PG(1 λ ) to obtain pars. Return pars. KG (pars): Run KG(pars) to obtain (sk , pk ). Return (sk , 0 pk ). Enc (pars, b pk , M ): Run Enc(pars, pk , M ) to obtain C. Return C. Dec (pars, b pk , sk , C): Return Dec(pars, pk , sk , C).
Observe that PKE is a correct public-key encryption scheme. Furthermore, PKE is not FROB. Consider the adversary A which runs KG (pars) to get a valid key-pair (sk , 0 pk ), picks a random message M and runs Enc (pars, 0 pk , M ) to obtain a ciphertext C. The adversary A gives (C, 0 pk , 1 pk , sk , sk ) as its final output. It is easy to see that A wins with probability 1: 0 pk = 1 pk and the decryption of C with the secret key sk returns a valid message due to correctness.
We now show PKE is USROB. Suppose there is an adversary A which wins the USROB game against PKE . We construct an adversary B that interacts with A to win the USROB game against PKE with the same probability. Algorithm B(pars) runs A(pars) and handles A's queries by forwarding them to its own oracles simply prepending a zero-bit to all the public keys sent and received. Finally, when A outputs (C, pk 0 , pk 1 ) with pk 0 = pk 1 , B also outputs the same tuple. It's easy to see that B provides a perfect simulation of A's environment, and that if A wins so does B.
Proposition 6 (SROB-CCA =⇒ USROB). Let PKE be a public-key encryption scheme which is SROB-CCA. Then there is a scheme PKE which is SROB-CCA, but fails to be USROB.
PG (1 λ ): Run PG(1 λ ) to obtain pars. Return pars. KG (pars): Run KG(pars) to obtain (sk , pk ). Sample s ←$ {0, 1} λ and return (sk s, pk ). Enc (pars, pk , M ): Run Enc(pars, pk , M ) to obtain ciphertext C. Return C. Dec (pars, pk , sk s, C): Parse C as C 1 C 2 . Run Dec(pars, pk , sk , C 1 ). If the output is a valid message M , return M . Otherwise, check if C 2 = s, and if so return a fixed (e.g., the lexicographically smallest) message M in the message space for pk . Else, return ⊥.
PKE is a correct public-key encryption scheme. 9 We first prove PKE is not USROB by constructing an adversary A which wins the USROB game against PKE . Algorithm A(pars) queries GetEK on two identities id 0 , id 1 to obtain, with overwhelming probability, two distinct public keys pk 0 and pk 1 . It then queries GetDK(id 0 ) and receives sk 0 s 0 . Algorithm A runs Enc (pars, pk 1 , M 1 ), where M 1 is any (valid) message, obtaining C 1 . Adversary A then sets C 2 := s 0 and outputs (C := (C 1 C 2 ), pk 0 , pk 1 ) as its final output. It is easy to see that this is a winning strategy for A: C when decrypted with respect to pk 1 would return M 1 due to the correctness of the scheme. Furthermore, when decrypted with respect to pk 0 we obtain a valid message M since C 2 = s 0 .
We now prove that PKE is SROB-CCA. Suppose there is an adversary A which wins the SROB-CCA game against PKE . We construct an adversary B that interacts with A to win the SROB-CCA game against PKE. Algorithm B(pars) runs A(pars) and handles its queries as follows:
-GetEK(id) query: B queries its own GetEK(id) to get a public key pk . It then selects and stores a random bit-string s of length λ. Algorithm B gives pk to A. -GetDK(id) query: B queries its own GetDK(id) for the corresponding secret key sk . Algorithm B then retrieves and appends s to sk and gives sk s as the response to A. -Dec(C 1 C 2 , pk ) query: B passes (C 1 , pk ) to its own oracle. If the answer is a valid message M , B forwards M to A. If the output is ⊥, B checks whether C 2 is equal to s (which it holds). If so, B outputs M as the response to A's query. If not, B returns ⊥.
Finally, when A outputs (C 1 C 2 , pk 0 , pk 1 ), B outputs (C 1 , pk 0 , pk 1 ). We note that B provides a perfect simulation of A's environment and that B wins whenever A wins unless A does so by guessing the s-component of either pk 0 or pk 1 . Since these s-components are random and information theoretically hidden from A's view, the probability of this event is at most 2 · Note that by Proposition 4 we also have that SROB-CCA =⇒ KROB. The following proposition provides a separation in the reverse direction.
Proposition 7 (KROB =⇒ WROB-CPA). Let PKE be a public-key encryption scheme which is KROB. Then there is a scheme PKE which is KROB, but fails to be WROB-CPA.
Proof. We define the required scheme PKE to be identical to PKE except its decryption algorithm, which we modify as follows:
Dec (pars, pk , sk , C): If Dec(pars, pk , sk , C) is a valid message M , return M . If not return a fixed (e.g., the lexicographically smallest) message M in the message space for pk .
It is easy to see that PKE is correct but it is not WROB-CPA: the decryption algorithm never returns ⊥. However, the modified scheme is still KROB as the tweaked decryption algorithm does not affect the KROB game.
By Proposition 1 we have that SROB-CCA =⇒ XROB, and by Proposition 3 we have that XROB =⇒ SROB-CPA. The implication to WROB is proved next.
Proposition 8 (XROB =⇒ WROB-CCA). Let PKE be a public-key encryption scheme which is XROB. Then PKE is also WROB-CCA.
Proof. Let A be a WROB-CCA adversary. We construct an XROB adversary B as follows. Algorithm B on input pars runs A(pars) and answers its various queries as follows:
-GetEK(id) query: B generates a new key-pair (sk , pk ), stores them on a list, and passes the public key to A. -GetDK(pk ) query: B retrieves the secret key corresponding to pk and pass it on to A. -Dec(C, pk ) query: B retrieves the secret key corresponding to pk , uses it to decrypt the ciphertext, and returns the result to A.
When A terminates by outputting (M, pk 0 , pk 1 ), algorithm B proceeds as follows. It first samples coins r 0 for the encryption algorithm and computes C 1 := Enc(pars, pk 1 , M ; r). It then returns (M, pk 0 , r 0 , C 1 , pk 1 , sk 1 ) as its final output, where sk 1 is the secret key corresponding to pk 1 . It is easy to see that B runs A in an environment identical to WROB-CCA. Furthermore, whenever A is successful in winning this game, algorithm B also breaks the XROB property.
G Definitions for Commitment Schemes
Recall that a commitment scheme (CPG, Com, Ver) is a triple of probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms where, on input of a security parameter λ, CPG outputs public parameters cpars; Com takes as input a message m and outputs a commitment/de-commitment pair (com, dec) ←$ Com(cpars, m), and Ver(cpars, m, com, dec) is deterministic and outputs 0 or 1. The correctness property guarantees that Ver always outputs 1 whenever (com, dec) is obtained by committing to m using honestly generated parameters. The binding property demands that, given cpars, no PPT adversary should be able to produce a commitment that can be opened to two distinct messages. More precisely, for any PPT adversary A we require that the following advantage term is negligible as a function of λ.
A commitment is also said hiding if for any PPT adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) the following advantage term is negligible as a function of λ.
H Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We treat the three possible cases corresponding to FROB, KROB, and XROB. Given an FROB adversary A against PKE we construct an adversary B 1 that will interact with A to break the binding property of CMT . The game proceeds as follows.
Let C be B 1 's challenger. C runs CPG to obtain the commitment schemes's parameters cpars and passes them on to B 1 . Algorithm B 1 runs PG to obtain pars, which it passes to A together with cpars. Algorithm B 1 handles all of A's queries.
Finally, A outputs (C, pk 0 , pk 1 , sk 0 , sk 1 ), where C = (c, com) and pk 0 = pk 1 . Now, B 1 runs the decryption algorithm twice, obtaining M 0 ← Dec(pars, pk 0 , sk 0 , C) and M 1 ← Dec(pars, pk 1 , sk 1 , C). Let Succ be the event that M 0 =⊥ and M 1 =⊥. If Succ occurs then B 1 parses M 0 and M 1 intoM 0 dec 0 andM 1 dec 1 , respectively. It then gives (com, pk 0 , pk 1 , dec 0 , dec 1 ) to C as its final output.
B 1 provides a perfect simulation for A as well as a legal strategy for attacking the binding property of CMT , provided Succ occurs. Since this happens whenever A is a winning adversary against the full robustness of PKE, we have that B 1 's advantage is the same as A's.
Given a KROB adversary A against PKE we construct an adversary B 2 that will interact with A to break the binding property of CMT . The game proceeds as follows.
Let C be B 2 's challenger. C runs CPG to obtain the commitment schemes's parameters cpars and passes them on to B 2 . Algorithm B 2 runs PG to obtain pars, which it passes to A together with cpars. Algorithm B 2 handles all of A's queries.
A outputs (M 0 , M 1 , pk 0 , pk 1 , r 0 , r 1 ), where pk 0 = pk 1 , r 0 = (r 0cmt , r 0enc ) and r 1 = (r 1cmt , r 1enc ). Now, B 2 runs Com(cpars, pk 0 ; r 0com ), obtaining (com 0 , dec 0 ), and Com(cpars, pk 1 ; r 1com ), obtaining (com 1 , dec 1 ). Then B 2 computes ciphertexts c 0 = Enc(pars, pk 0 , M 0 dec 0 ; r 0enc ) and c 1 = Enc(pars, pk 1 , M 1 dec 1 ; r 1enc ). Let C 0 = (c 0 , com 0 ) and C 1 = (c 1 , com 1 ) . Let Succ be the event that C 0 = C 1 (and therefore c 0 = c 1 = c and com 0 = com 1 = com). If Succ occurs then B 2 outputs (com, pk 0 , pk 1 , dec 0 , dec 1 ) and gives it to C. B 2 provides a perfect simulation for A as well as a legal strategy for attacking the binding property of CMT , provided Succ occurs. Since this happens whenever A is a winning adversary against the key-less robustness of PKE, we have that B 2 's advantage is the same as A's.
Given an XROB adversary A against PKE we construct an adversary B 3 that will interact with A to break the binding property of CMT . The game proceeds as follows.
Let C be B 3 's challenger. C runs CPG to obtain the commitment scheme's parameters cpars and passes them on to B 3 . The latter runs PG to obtain pars, which it passes to A together with cpars. Then, B 3 handles all of A's queries during the game.
Eventually, A outputs (M 0 , pk 0 , r 0 , C 1 , pk 1 , sk 1 ), where pk 0 = pk 1 , r 0 = (r 0cmt , r 0enc ). At this point, B 3 runs Com(cpars, pk 0 ; r 0com ), obtaining (com 0 , dec 0 ), and Dec(pars, pk 1 , sk 1 , C 1 ), obtaining M 1 . Then B 3 computes c 0 = Enc(pars, pk 0 , M 0 dec 0 ; r 0enc ). Let C 0 = (c 0 , com 0 ) and C 1 = (c 1 , com 1 ). Let Succ be the event that C 0 = C 1 (and therefore c 0 = c 1 = c and com 0 = com 1 = com). If Succ occurs then B 3 outputs (com, pk 0 , pk 1 , dec 0 , dec 1 ) and gives it to C. B 3 provides a perfect simulation for A as well as a legal strategy for attacking the binding property of CMT , provided Succ occurs. Since this happens whenever A is a winning adversary against the key-less robustness of PKE, we have that B 3 's advantage is the same as A's.
I Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. The proof proceeds with a sequence of games. For each i, we call S i that event that A calls Finalize on input b = 0 in Game i.
Game 1: is the real game when the challenger's bit equals b = 0. Namely, the adversary A interacts with an actual AI-ATK challenger who sets b = 0 in the Setup procedure. The challenger always runs the Dec procedure according to its specification. When A makes its unique LR query (M 0 , M 1 ), the challenger computes (com , dec ) ←$ Com(cpars, pk 0 ) and C ←$ Enc pars, pk 0 , M 0 dec , com . The adversary A is given (C , com ) as a challenge ciphertext. The game ends with A invoking Finalize with a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
Game 2: is exactly like Game 1 with one difference in the description of the LR procedure. Namely, the challenge ciphertext (C , com ) is generated by computing a pair (com , dec ) ←$ Com(cpars, pk 0 ) and a ciphertext C ←$ Enc pars, pk 1 , M 1 0 |dec | , com , where 0 |dec | denotes the all-zeroes string of the same length as dec .
We claim that there is a PPT algorithm
. Namely, B 1 interacts with its own AI-ATK challenger and plays the role of A's challenger. At the beginning of the game, B 1 generates cpars by running CPG and, when receiving (pars, pk 0 , pk 1 ) of PKE from its challenger, it gives (pars, cpars, pk 0 , pk 1 ) to A. When A decides to invoke the LR oracle on the input of (M 0 , M 1 ), B 1 first computes a commitment/de-commitment pair (com , dec ) ←$ Com(cpars, pk 0 ). It then defines messages
= com , and queries its own LR oracle on (L , M 0 , M 1 ). The latter oracle replies with C ←$ Enc(pars, pk β , M β , L ), for some random bit β ∈ R {0, 1}, and B 1 gives (C , com ) to A. Whenever A makes a Dec query for a pair b, (C, com) , B 1 queries its own Dec oracle for the input (b, C, com) (note that this is a decryption query for the label L = com). When receiving the answer M dec, B 1 checks if Ver(cpars, pk b , com, dec) = 1 and, if so, returns M to A. If its decryption oracle returns ⊥ or if it happens that Ver(cpars, pk b , com, dec) = 0, B 1 returns ⊥ to A. We observe that, due to the use of labels, B 1 can always answer A's decryption queries using its own Dec oracle. Indeed, after the challenge phase, A is disallowed to query the decryption oracle on (d, C , com ), for each d ∈ {0, 1}. This implies that B 1 will never query its Dec oracle on an input of the form d, C , com , with d ∈ {0, 1}: if C = C , it must be the case that com = com = L .
It is easy to see that, if B 1 's challenger chooses the bit β = 0, B 1 is playing Game 1 with A. In the situation where β = 1, B 1 and A are playing Game 2.
Game 3: In this game, we bring a new change in the generation of the challenge ciphertext (C , com ). Now A's challenger generates a commitment/de-commitment pair with respect to pk 1 : more precisely, it commits to pk 1 by computing (com , dec ) ←$ Com(cpars, pk 1 ). Then, as in Game 2, it computes C ←$ Enc(pars, pk 1 , M 1 0 |dec | ,L ), where L = com . If CMT is a hiding commitment, Game 3 is clearly indistinguishable from Game 2. Indeed, it is straightforward to construct a distinguisher B 2 such that | Pr[
We bring a final change to the computation of the challenge ciphertext (C , com ). Namely, A's challenger commits to the public key pk 1 by computing (com , dec ) ←$ Com(cpars, pk 1 ). Then, it computes C ←$ Enc(pars,
This game is exactly the real game when A's challenger chooses the bit b = 1 at the beginning of the experiment. There exists a PPT algorithm B 3 such that | Pr[ We now prove that the scheme is completely robust.
Proof. We show that the scheme is simultaneously FROB, KROB, and XROB. Let us first assume that A defeats the FROB property and outputs (C, com) and two private keys sk 0 , sk 1 such that, for each b ∈ {0, 1}, the ciphertext C decrypts to messages M b dec b = Dec(pars, pk b , sk b , (C, com), com) such that Ver(cpars, pk 0 , com, dec 0 ) = 1 and Ver(cpars, pk 1 , com, dec 1 ) = 1 although pk 0 = pk 1 . Then, the binding property of CMT is necessarily broken.
Similar arguments apply in the KROB scenario, where the adversary outputs two pairs (M b , pk b , r b ), with b ∈ {0, 1} and pk 0 = pk 1 , resulting in colliding ciphertexts C = Enc (pars, cpars), pk b , M b , r b for PKE. It necessarily means that r b contains incorporated random coins r b for which we have (com b , dec b ) ← Com(cpars, pk b ; r b ) with com = com 0 = com 1 . This implies Ver(cpars, pk 0 , com, dec 0 ) = 1 and Ver(cpars, pk 1 , com, dec 1 ) = 1, which also contradicts the assumption that CMT is binding.
Finally, in the XROB case, the adversary outputs (M 0 , pk 0 , r 0 , C 1 , pk 1 , sk 1 ) such that M 0 =⊥ and, if we compute (C, com) ← Enc (pars, cpars), pk 0 , M 0 ; r 0 and M 1 dec 1 ← Dec(pars, pk 1 , sk 1 , (C, com), com), it holds that Ver(cpars, pk 1 , com, dec 1 ) = 1. In this case, r 0 must also contain random commitment coins such that (com, dec 0 ) ← Com(cpars, pk 0 ; r 0 ) and thus Ver(cpars, pk 0 , com, dec 0 ) = 1. It means that we also end up with openings (pk b , dec b ) of the same commitment com to distinct messages pk 0 and pk 1 .
J Proof of Theorem 5
Let us first briefly recall that a multi-authority IBE scheme [26] consists of algorithms IBE = (IBE.PG, IBE.MPG, IBE.KG, IBE.Enc, IBE.Dec), corresponding to cross-TA common parameter generation, master key generation for each TA, user key generation, encryption, and decryption routines respectively. The notion of sID-TAA-CPA security for IBE schemes in the multi-authority setting is formalized in Figure 10 . It is shown in [26, 27] that applying the original CHK transformation to an sID-TAA-CPA secure IBE scheme provides an AI-CCA-secure PKE. We will prove that our modification of the Boneh-Katz transformation gives the same result.
It is worth noting that sID-TAA-CPA secure IBE schemes are available in the literature. Indeed, a sufficient condition for IBE schemes to satisfy the notion of sID-TAA-CPA security is to have pseudorandom ciphertexts: namely, ciphertexts should be computationally indistinguishable from a sequence of random group elements. Many anonymous IBE schemes (e.g., [19, 11, 16, 5] ) have this property. We now prove Theorem 5.
Proof. The proof uses a sequence of games which is similar to that of [9] . For each i, we call S i that event that Finalize receives the input b = 0 from A in Game i.
Game 1: is the real game when the challenger's bit is b = 0. Namely, the adversary A interacts with an actual AI-CCA challenger that runs the actual Setup procedure. The challenger always runs the GetDK procedure by following its exact specification. When the adversary A sends its unique LR query (M 0 , M 1 ), the challenger picks k ←$ {0, 1} at random, computes a commitment/de-commitment pair (com , dec ) ←$ Com(cpars, mpk 0 k ) and an IBE ciphertext C ←$ IBE.Enc mpk 0 , com , M 0 k dec . 10 Then, A is given (C , com , tag ), where tag = MacGen k (C ), as a challenge ciphertext. At the end of the game, A calls Finalize with an input bit b ∈ {0, 1}. We observe that, without loss of generality, k and (com , dec ) ←$ Com(cpars, mpk 0 k ) can be chosen at the beginning of the game, during the execution of Setup.
Game 2: is identical to Game 1, except that the Dec oracle now rejects all decryption queries (C, com, tag) such that com = com . Clearly, Game 2 is identical to Game 1 until Dec rejects a ciphertext that would not have been rejected in Game 1. We distinguish the following cases in this event:
makes a Dec query (C, com, tag) involving mpk 0 , B 1 queries its own GetDK oracle whenever com = com to decrypt (when obtaining the answer M k dec, it returns M if Ver(cpars, mpk 0 k, com, dec) = 1 and MacVer k (C) = 1 and ⊥ otherwise simply chooses a random index i ←$ {1, . . . , q}, invokes its MAC generation oracle to compute tag in the challenge ciphertext and outputs the pair (C i , tag i ) contained in the i-th decryption query.
When combining the above steps, we find that
Now, we are ready to proceed with Game 3, where we only have to worry about decryption queries (C, com, tag) such that com = com .
Game 3: we modify the generation of the challenge ciphertext analogously to the transition from Game 2 to Game 2.1. Namely, instead of computing (com , dec ) ←$ Com(cpars, mpk 0 k ) at the outset of the game, (com , dec ) is computed by committing to a random message R. In the challenge phase, the challenger uses the trapdoor of T CMT to equivocate com and find
The challenge ciphertext (C , com , tag ) is computed as
Since T CMT is a trapdoor commitment scheme, this change is purely conceptual since the pair (com , dec ) has the same distribution as if it were produced by committing to mpk 0 k . For this reason, we know that Pr[S 3 ] = Pr[S 2 ] although the distribution of com does not depend on mpk 0 k . Game 4: we change again the generation of the challenge ciphertext. In this game, the pair (com , dec ) is again generated by committing to a random value. However, the IBE part C of the challenge ciphertext is now computed as
To justify the transition from Game 3 to Game 4, we describe a sID-TAA-CPA adversary B 3 against the IBE scheme that "bridges" between the two games in such a way that | Pr[
Concretely, B 3 interacts with its own sID-TAA-CPA challenger and embodies A's challenger. At the beginning of its interaction with A, B 3 chooses the description MAC and generates cpars using CPG. It computes (com , dec ) by committing to a random value R and announces com as the identity that it wishes to be challenged upon. When obtaining the common public parameters pars and master public keys mpk 0 , mpk 1 from its sID-TAA-CPA challenger, it gives (pars, cpars, MAC) as well as mpk 0 , mpk 1 to A. At this point, B 3 equivocates com twice to find suitable de-commitments dec 0 , dec 1 such that Ver(cpars, mpk 0 k , com , dec 0 ) = 1, Ver(cpars, mpk 1 k , com , dec 1 ) = 1. When the AI-CCA adversary A calls the LR oracle with input values (M 0 , M 1 ), B 3 defines messages M 0 = M 0 k dec 0 , M 1 = M 1 k dec 1 which are sent to B 3 's LR oracle in the sID-TAA-CPA security game. The latter oracle returns C ←$ IBE.Enc(mpk , com , M β ), where β ∈ R {0, 1}, and B 3 prepares A's challenge ciphertext as (C , com , tag ), where tag = MacGen k (C ). Whenever A makes a Dec query (C, com, tag) involving mpk 0 or mpk 1 , B 3 queries its own Dec oracle when com = com (upon receiving the answer M k dec, it proceeds as in step 2 of Dec). If com = com , B 3 returns ⊥. By inspection, it can be checked that, if B 3 's challenger chooses β = 0, B 3 and A are playing Game 3. If β = 1, they are playing Game 4. As claimed, it comes that | Pr[
Game 5: is identical to Game 4 except that the commitment/de-commitment pair (com , dec ) is now computed by committing to mpk 1 k (and (M 1 k dec ) is IBE-encrypted in the challenge phase, as previously) instead of equivocating com . This change does not affect A's view since (com , dec ) has the same distribution either way. We thus have Pr[
Game 6: is exactly the same as Game 5 but the Dec oracle does no longer reject any decryption queries (C, com, tag) such that com = com . Instead, the real Dec algorithm is always used. This transition can be justified completely analogously to that between Game 2 and Game 3 (in other words, the probability that one ciphertext gets rejected in one game and not in the previous one is the same) and we can write:
for certain PPT algorithms B 0 , B 1 , and B 2 .
It is easy to see that Game 6 is the real game when the challenger's bit is b = 1. By collecting probabilities, the announced result follows.
The proof of complete robustness of the scheme is similar to that of Theorem 4 and omitted.
K Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. To argue for the AI-CCA security, we prove that, even if the adversary has access to a decryption oracle, ciphertexts are computationally indistinguishable from "dummy" ciphertexts that are statistically independent of the plaintext or the receiver's public key. Since all ciphertexts live in the same space, regardless of the public key, this guarantees AI-CCA security.
Concretely, we show that the adversary cannot distinguish a real game from an ideal game. In the former, he has access to a decryption oracle and, in the challenge phase, obtains a properly generated encryption of the plaintext M of his choice. In the latter, the challenge ciphertext is a dummy ciphertext that has nothing to do with the plaintext chosen by the adversary or the receiver's public key. We prove that, even with the help of a decryption oracle, the adversary A cannot distinguish the two worlds. The proof uses a sequence of games. For each i, we call S i the event that the adversary outputs b = 1 at the end of Game i.
Game 1: is the real game with the difference that, in the challenge phase, the adversary is given an encryption of a random plaintext. The adversary is given a public key pk and access to a decryption oracle. In the challenge phase, it outputs a plaintext M . The challenger responds by encrypting M . At the end of the game, after a second series of decryption queries, the adversary outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
Game 2: is like Game 1 but we change the generation of the public key pk . Namely, u and v are chosen as
using random x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ←$ Z p . If we define ω = log g (h), this implicitly defines x = x 1 + ωx 2 and y = y 1 + ωy 2 . As in Game 1, the challenger rejects all decryption queries (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , tag) for which C 2 = C x·τ +y 1
. It is clear that these changes are purely conceptual since pk has the same distribution as before. For, this reason, we have Pr[S 2 ] = Pr[S 1 ].
Game 3: is identical to Game 2 but the challenger rejects all decryption queries (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , tag) such that C 1 = C 1 and TCR(C 1 ) = TCR(C 1 ) (we assume, without loss of generality, that C 1 is computed at the beginning of the game). If the adversary A manages to create a ciphertext that is rejected in Game 3 but would not have been rejected in Game 2, the challenger B can clearly use A to break the target collision-resistance of TCR. We can thus write | Pr[ It means that we have C 1 = g r and C 2 = (u τ · v) r · g r for some r ∈ Z p and some r = 0. The decryption oracle thus computes Ω = h r · g r /(τ ·x 2 +y 2 ) , which is uniformly random from A's view. Indeed, it is the product of h r , which is uniquely determined by C 1 , and g r /(τ ·x 2 +y 2 ) that is completely independent of A's view because the public key reveals no information about (x 2 , y 2 ). The same analysis as in [23, 18, 20] shows that creating an invalid ciphertext that does not get rejected amounts to forging a MAC for a randomly chosen key or breaking the security of the key-derivation function. We also note that the value ω = log g (h) is not used by the decryption oracle anymore.
Game 6: We modify the generation of the challenge ciphertext. Namely, the challenger B first defines η 1 = g r , η 2 = h r and τ = TCR(η 1 ), for a randomly chosen r ←$ Z p , and computes Game 7: We change again the generation of the challenge (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , tag ). Namely, η 2 is now chosen at random in G instead of being defined as η 2 = h r , where r = log g (η 1 ). Under the DDH assumption, this modification should not significantly affect A's view. It comes that | Pr[
. Game 8: In this game, we can use the value ω = log g (h) since we are done with the DDH assumption. Here, the decryption oracle rejects again all ciphertexts (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , tag) for which C 2 = C τ ·x+y 1 , where τ = TCR(C 1 ), x = x 1 + ωx 2 and y = y 1 + ωy 2 . For each ciphertext (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , tag) such that C 1 = g r and C 2 = (u τ · v) r · g r , with r = 0, the decryption oracle of Game 7 derives (K 0 , K 1 ) from Ω = h r · g r /(τ ·x 2 +y 2 ) .
In (K.2), we now have η 1 = g r and η 2 = h r +r , for some r ∈ R Z p and r = 0. The challenge ciphertext is thus distributed as
and it reveals h r ·(τ ·x 2 +y 2 ) in the information theoretic sense. However, we have τ = τ unless the failure event of Game 3 occurs, so that τ · x 2 + y 2 and τ · x 2 + y 2 are independent. This means that Ω is uniformly random from A's view. The only way for A to create an invalid ciphertext that would be rejected in Game 8 and not in Game 7 is to break the unforgeability of MAC or the security of the key-derivation function. Using the same arguments as in, e.g., [20] . In Game 8, we claim that C 1 , C 2 , and η 2 (which is used to derive the keys (K 0 , K 1 ) = KDF(η 2 ) in the challenge ciphertext) look independent to A. Indeed, from (K.3) and since the value τ · x 2 + y 2 is independent of A's view, (C 1 , C 2 , η 2 ) is statistically indistinguishable from a triple of three random and independent group elements.
Game 9: We change again the construction of the challenge ciphertext. Namely, we choose K 0 and K 1 at random instead of deriving them from η 2 . Since KDF is a secure key-derivation function, we have | Pr[S 9 ] − Pr[S 8 ]| ≤ Adv kdf KDF (B). Game 10: We bring one more change to the computation of the challenge ciphertext (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , tag ). Namely, instead of computing tag = MacGen K 1 (H(C 1 , pk )), we compute the MAC as tag = MacGen Game 11: We introduce a final change in the generation of (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , tag ). Namely, instead of computing C 3 as C 3 = E K 0 (M ), we symmetrically encrypt a random plaintext M which is chosen independently of M . Clearly, any significant change in A's behavior would contradict the semantic security of the symmetric cipher (E, D) and we can write | Pr In Game 11, the challenge ciphertext (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , tag ) is perfectly independent of the public key pk and the message M chosen by A.
We now prove the second part of the theorem.
Proof. Let us assume that an adversary can break one of the FROB, KROB or XROB notions. We show that it can either find a collision on H or contradict the assumption of MAC being committing.
We first consider the FROB case and assume that, on input of pars, an adversary A is able to output a ciphertext C = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , tag) and two keys pairs (sk , pk ), (sk , pk ) such that C correctly decrypts under both sk = (x, y, z) and sk = (x , y , z ). If we define (K 0 , K 1 ) = KDF(C z 1 ) and (K 0 , K 1 ) = KDF(C z 1 ), we must have MacVer K 1 (H(C 3 , pk ), tag) = 1 and MacVer K 1 (H(C 3 , pk ), tag) = 1. It means that either:
-H(C 3 , pk ) = H(C 3 , pk ), in which case the collision resistance of H is broken since pk = pk . -MAC is not a committing MAC because there exist two keys K 1 , K 1 and two distinct messages R = H(C 3 , pk ), R = H(C 3 , pk ) such that MacVer K 1 (R, tag) = 1 and MacVer K 1 (R , tag) = 1.
It is straightforward that the same arguments apply in KROB and XROB cases.
